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Introduction
The European Monetary Union (EMU) is the most ambitious step to have been taken as part of the long process of European integration. As the so-called Five Presidents' Report 1 recently stated, the euro is more than just a currency. "It is a political and economic project and it only works as long as all members gain from it". Thus, in the recently renewed process of enhancing its design, it is crucial to evaluate the effective gains that the euro has brought for each of the member states.
In the years prior to the launching of the euro area, many voices 2 recalled that the euro area did not satisfy the conditions identified in the theory of Optimal Currency Areas (OCA) for a welfare-improving monetary union. Belonging to a monetary union means giving up control of monetary policy, which may become a key instrument in the presence of asymmetric shocks. As mentioned by Mundell (1961) , the costs of losing the monetary instrument will be all the lower the higher wage flexibility is, the higher labour mobility is or, as
De Grauwe (2013) recalled more recently, whenever the monetary union is also embedded in a budgetary union. However, it was also thought that launching a monetary union would entail undoubted benefits via the increase in trade and investment. The Delors Report (1989) and the One Market One Money Report 3 , which greatly influenced the adoption of the euro, considered that the main welfare improvement ingredient was expected to result from the elimination of exchange rate risk, which had traditionally been one of the main sources of uncertainty characterising Europe (De Grauwe P, 2012) . This, together with the expected reduction of interest rates, led the Commission to conclude that the adoption of the euro would move the euro area to a durable higher growth path.
Has this prediction come true? Figure 1 displays the average euro area yearly growth rate of per capita GDP, employment and inflation for the period before (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) ) and the period after the adoption of the euro in 1999, divided into two sub-periods: 1999-2007 and 2008-2011. We also depict yearly growth rates of the three variables for Japan, the United
States and the United Kingdom. From the cross-country comparison, the chart points out that the euro area has achieved significant progress in terms of generating employment and reducing inflation. However, in terms of the GDP per capita growth rate, aggregate data for the euro area does not seem to follow the expected path: "a jump to a permanent higher growth path". Moreover, when looking at the Great Recession period, the euro area has undergone a contraction in terms of GDP per capita and employment greater than that registered in the United States and Japan.
This paper attempts to shed some light on whether the euro had a significant impact on the GDP growth rate of the euro area. The question we seek to answer is what euro area GDP per capita would have been had the monetary union not been launched. The question is not new in the economic literature. Drake and Mills (2010) , using data since 1980, decompose euro area GDP into trend and cyclical components through the "optimal approximation" band pass filter developed by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) . The GDP trend they obtained, both under the assumption that it evolves as a deterministic function or as a stochastic process, suggests that the adoption of the euro appears to have reduced the This article examines the impact of the introduction of the euro in terms of real GDP per capita, as in Giannone, Lenza and Reichlin et al (2010), but using the synthetic control methodology that was first introduced in the economic literature by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) . We build a counterfactual that closely reproduces euro area GDP per capita during the years before the intervention. The counterfactual is defined as a linear combination of countries of the donor pool that minimises the differences with the treated unit in a set of relevant covariates and past realisations of the outcome variable during the pre-intervention period. In this spirit, it becomes a key condition that countries that belong to the donor pool should look similar in terms of development to countries that belong to the euro area, and also that they do not turn out to be affected by the launching of the monetary union. Hence, the difference between the GDP per capita of the treated country (i.e. the euro area) and the counterfactual (i.e. the synthetic) from the year of the intervention onwards allows us to quantify the impact of the monetary union.
4. The choice of US output as a conditioning variable is motivated by the findings that the dynamic correlation between US and euro area growth is robust and has been stable over time. has also been applied to quantify the effects of the large-scale tobacco control programme that California implemented in 1998 (Abadie et al, 2010) , to evaluate the economic impact of the 1990 German reunification on West Germany (Abadie et al, 2015) , to investigate the impact of economic liberalisation on real GDP per capita in a worldwide sample of countries (Billmeier and Nannicini, 2013) and to measure the impact of private sector reforms, such as the adoption of the one-stop shop, on GDP per capita (Gathani et al, 2013) . In the context of the European Union, Campos et al (2014) resort to the synthetic control methodology to analyse the growth gains from the European Union for its member countries, while Mäkelä (2014) addresses the question of whether the monetary union has affected its members' sovereign risk premiums.
Our main result is in line with that obtained previously in the literature: the adoption of the monetary union in the euro area did not produce the expected permanent increase in the GDP per capita growth rate. However, when we step down to the country-level details, we observe very different patterns. Firstly, central European countries -Germany, the Netherlands and Austria-did not seem to obtain any gains or losses from the adoption of the euro.
Secondly, among countries from the periphery, Ireland, Spain and Greece registered positive and significant gains throughout the years of expansion that followed the launching of the euro area but up to the debt crisis, while Italy and Portugal quickly lagged, despite the expansionary cycle, behind the GDP per capita predicted by their counterfactual.
The euro area was designed as an additional step in the process of European integration. It was thought it would bring further increases in intra-area trade that would boost GDP growth, mainly because of the stability of the exchange rates, as well as an endogenous demand for structural reforms that would also propel convergence within the euro area. The demand for structural reforms should have endogenously emerged from the need to design sufficiently flexible economies to face shocks without the use of the exchange rate. However, perhaps because of the arrival of China on the world trade stage and the resultant increase in the international fragmentation of production, intra-area trade did not rise. Neither did the boost for a consistent strategy to implement productivity enhancing reforms arrive, in a context where the previously inflationary member countries benefited from the favourable financing conditions.
The broad reduction in long term interest rates favored the recently so called reform anesthesia that propelled the divergences among member countries. Then, the initial welfare gains that the euro brought did not consolidated in the long run, leading the European project to a risky cliff.
Looking forward, it is crucial that all member countries benefit from the joint-venture and this is only possible if the euro area keeps on giving steps towards a stronger convergence via structural enhancing productivity reforms and an improvement of the European governance.
This spirit is shared by recent ECB research that attributes this lack of convergence to the notably weak institutions, structural rigidities, weak productivity growth and insufficient policies to address asset price booms (ECB, 2015) . Also, the Five Presidents' Report has called for "further steps, both individually and collectively, to compensate for the national adjustment tools that countries gave up on entry" in order for all members to gain from the euro.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section explains the synthetic control methodology. Section 3 displays the results that we obtain, devoting special attention to their robustness. Section 4 discusses a plausible interpretation of our results, while section 5 concludes.
The synthetic control methodology
Assume that there is a sample of J+1 units (in our case, countries) and unit j=1 is our unit of interest (in our case, the euro area), while units j=2 to j=J+1 are the potential comparisons.
The literature usually refers to unit j=1 as the "treated unit", i.e. the unit exposed to the event or intervention of interest, while units j=2 to j=J+1are referred to as the "donor pool", i.e. the group of potential comparison units. In order to be able to construct a reliable synthetic control, the donor pool has to fulfil three characteristics. First, it has to be restricted to countries with some similarity in observable characteristics in order to prevent interpolation biases; second, countries should not undergo structural shocks to the outcome variable during the sample period of the study; and third, their outcome should not be affected by the intervention implemented in the treated unit 5 .
Suppose that all units are observed during t=1,…,T periods, in such a way that the time span includes a positive number of pre-intervention periods, T0, and a positive number of post-intervention periods, T1, with T= T0+ T1.
Let Yjt be our variable of interest, namely GDP per capita, which would be observed for country j at time t in the absence of the intervention. Let be the outcome that would be observed for the treated country after being exposed to the intervention, that is, in periods T0+1 to T. Let be the effect of the intervention for the treated country at time t.
Then, under the general model: 
and ∑ *
5. Assumption of no interference across units (Rosenbaum, 2007) . We will further discuss in section 3 how this assumption may bias our results. 6. Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010) argue that if the number of pre-intervention periods in the data is large, matching on pre-intervention outcomes helps control for the unobserved factors affecting the outcome of interest as well as for the heterogeneity of the effect of the observed and unobserved factors on the outcome of interest. 7. These assumptions prevent extrapolation biases.
We can define, as long as the number of pre-intervention periods is large enough, the following estimator for :
Therefore, the synthetic control is defined as a weighted average of the units in the donor pool and can be represented by a J x 1 vector of weights W*=(w2,…,wJ+1)'.
In practice, the optimal vector of weights w* must satisfy conditions (2) There are several advantages to using this econometric approach. First of all, unlike the difference-in-difference approach, we do not choose who the comparison group is, since weights assigned to each of the members of the donor pool are data-driven. Second, once the synthetic unit is defined, we can follow growth performance over time without limiting the analysis to an average effect estimator. And finally, unlike linear regression models, the synthetic control methodology avoids extrapolation outside the support of the data.
3 Estimating the impact of the euro on euro area GDP per capita
The donor pool and variable selection
We use yearly country-level data for the period 1970-2013. The euro was adopted in 1999 so we will have a pre-intervention period of 29 years. However, our benchmark estimation will rely on a shorter pre-intervention period -1992 to 1998 -in order to isolate our preferred estimation from the potential benefits derived from the European integration process that took place during the 1970s in countries from northern and central Europe, and during the 1980s in southern European countries. In 1992, the European Union launched the Single Market and countries, for the first time, delegated economic policy functions to the European level.
In order to construct the donor pool we disregard countries that are at a very different stage of development, such as those from Asia, Africa or South America, since we want to avoid extrapolation biases. Moreover, we exclude countries that might potentially be affected by the consolidation of the euro area. That is why we exclude countries from the European Union, in particular the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden, since they voluntarily opted not to join the euro area. Finally, we also exclude eastern European countries that joined the euro or the EU at a later date. Therefore, we finally have 11 OECD countries in the donor pool: Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Norway, New
Zealand, Turkey and the United States. However, we are aware that our donor pool may still not be fully sterilised since the euro process may have had spillover effects on non-member countries. We will let the model operate and, once results are obtained, we will discuss the potential biases that may arise.
All the variables that we use are obtained from the OECD database. . Measuring our variable of interest in levels gives us the opportunity to check whether the adoption of the euro had a divergent long-run growth path or whether we faced a step effect that built up over time given the lags of the economy (Billmeier and Nancini, 2013) . For the set of characteristics we use standard economic predictors: share of public and private consumption in GDP, share of investment in GDP, share of exports and imports in GDP, average years of education 9 and the ratio of people aged 65 and above relative to the population aged between 16 and 64 years old (which we call the dependency ratio), in order to control for the demographic structure of the economy. We have also worked with variables to take into account country price dynamics and R&D investment, but the fit did not improve so we have not included them in our final specification.
Finally our definition of the euro area includes eleven countries. These are all the countries that met the euro convergence criteria in 1998 10 , excluding Luxembourg, and adding Greece, which did not qualify until two years later. Despite this slight difference in timing, we will consider 1999 as the intervention date when examining the euro area aggregate.
8. We consider real per capita GDP PPP-adjusted because this facilitates international comparisons on the levels of economic activity. We follow the OECD recommendation of deflating per capita GDP by the PPP of a fixed year. It has both the advantage of using a price structure that is consistently updated and of protecting against the variance from one year to another of PPP calculations (see Lequiller and Blades, 2014 
Results
One of the advantages of the synthetic control methodology is that results can be displayed easily in one chart that needs little clarification. This chart is depicted in Figure 2 : it displays euro area GDP per capita and its synthetic counterpart for the years 1992 through 2013. The synthetic euro area almost exactly reproduces observed GDP per capita during the preintervention period. Moreover, this close fit is not only limited to the variable of interest but also to most of the GDP determinants (see Table 1 ). The estimation of the impact of the euro on GDP per capita of the euro area is given by the difference between the observed GDP per capita and the synthetic counterpart since 1999. Our estimation shows that, after the adoption of the euro, the area's GDP per capita is 2.7% higher on average than it would have been, had the euro not been launched. However, these initial gains did not last and they completely disappear before the mid-2000s. Results
show that between 2004 and 2007, euro area GDP per capita is 0.7% lower on average than it could have been, if the euro project had not been implemented. That is, our finding seems to sum up the previous evidence in Drake and Miller (2010) and Giannone et al. (2010) suggesting that the adoption of the euro did not bring the expected jump to a durable higher growth path. In fact, in the year prior to the start of the Great Recession, euro area GDP per capita fell slightly below the level predicted by the counterfactual. In the following section we perform different exercises to show the robustness of the result: slight initial gains from the adoption of the euro that did not last.
Robustness of the results
On the benchmark specification we opted for a short pre-treatment period mainly in order to isolate the gains from adopting the euro from the gains of European integration. Therefore, the first exercise to assess the robustness of the result depicted in Figure 2 is to consider a longer pre-treatment period: from 1970 to 1998. To further assess whether we could attribute to the adoption of the euro the difference between the changes observed in GDP per capita and its synthetic counterpart, we perform two placebo exercises. In the first, we check whether the treatment had any effect on a country, Australia, which does not belong to the euro area. Results are reported in Figure 4 .
In the second exercise we assume instead that the treatment took place in a different year,
1995. In this case we are somewhat limited because the 1980s and the 1990s were decades of continuous developments in European economic integration. Results of this placebo exercise are reported in Figure 5 .
In both cases we obtain a good match between the GDP per capita of the country treated and the counterfactual during the pre-treatment years. Besides, as we were expecting, no differences emerge between the variables after the treatments. This evidence backs the idea that the differences observed in Figure 2 can be attributed to the adoption of the euro and are not potentially reflecting the lack of predictive power of the synthetic control. At this point we illustrate the country and the variable weights, i.e. the W and the v that we obtain from the estimation of the synthetic euro area GDP per capita . In Table 2 we display the weight that countries in the donor pool ultimately receive in each of the three counterfactuals for the euro area we have shown so far (Figure 2 , Figure 3 and Figure 5 ). Switzerland and Turkey turn out to be the countries that receive more weight across the three counterfactuals, up to 50%, while Iceland, Japan, Norway and New Zealand make up the other 50%. As we pointed out in the previous section, a major concern arising from this approach is that the construction of the euro area may potentially have a positive or a negative effect not only on its member countries but also on the countries included in the donor pool. If this were the case, the assumption of non-interference across units would no longer apply and we would not be able to construct a proper counterfactual. The estimated gap would then be a lower bound, in the case of positive spillovers, or an upper bound, in the case of negative spillovers.
To tackle this issue we first repeat, for every single country in the donor pool, the placebo exercise reported in Figure 4 for Australia. Results, reported in Figure Euro Area GDP pc dimensions 11 to be matched during the pre-intervention period. However, in these two cases, the vector of weights obtained does not seem to match euro area per capita GDP before 1999, invalidating them as a reliable counterfactual. 
The effect on individual member countries
The results we have obtained so far point to a negligible impact of the adoption of the euro on GDP per capita of the euro area aggregate. However, the effect for individual countries is heterogeneous and also changes over time. In this section we intend to address the question of the degree to which certain countries have benefited from the adoption of the euro. Table A1 documents the weights that each country of the donor pool receives within each counterfactual and Table A2 assesses the goodness of fit for each of the variables that we consider during the pre-intervention period.
When looking at the central European countries we undoubtedly find that for three of them, the Netherlands, Germany and Austria, the adoption of the euro did not result in any gains or losses and, as a result, did not bring the expected jump in GDP per capita. These results hold when we extend the pre-intervention period to 1970-1998 (see Figure A2 of the Appendix). Unfortunately, given the common structure we have considered in terms of variables and countries in the donor pool, the counterfactual for French GDP per capita is not as good as might have been desirable. Nevertheless, we find that France registered the same result as the euro area aggregate: slight initial gains that did not last, were soon erased and 11. When optimizing over two dimensions we take into account GDP per capita and share of exports, while when we optimize over three dimensions we also add the share of investment. Euro area GDP pc turned into losses. Regarding Belgium and Finland we find two opposite patterns. While Finland would seem to be benefitting from the adoption of the euro, Belgian GDP per capita would be below its counterfactual.
Turning now to the peripheral European countries, we can distinguish two subgroups. On one hand, three countries, Spain, Greece and Ireland 12 registered the expected jump to a durable higher growth path of GDP per capita. And this jump turned out to last throughout the expansion period, in contrast with the evidence we found for the euro area aggregate. In Figure A3 of the Appendix we also show that results remain when we consider a longer pre-intervention period. On the other, Italy and Portugal stand out as countries where the initial gains from the adoption of the euro in terms of GDP per capita disappeared very quickly but also turned into significant losses from the path of the counterfactual. 12. In the case of Ireland, we have not been able to obtain a good counterfactual, this is a vector of country weights that matches closely GDP per capita of Ireland for the pre-treatment period. 
Significance of the results
One important caveat of the synthetic control methodology is that it does not allow us to assess the significance of the results obtained. In Table 6 we report the average magnitude of the gains/losses from the adoption of the euro that we depicted in Figure 2 In order to assess the significance of these gaps we have followed the approach of The significance is reported in Table 6 using the conventional asterisks.
As expected from scrutiny of Figure 9 , we cannot conclude that the initial small 5.8%, 10.4% and 24.3% higher, respectively, than it could have been, if the euro had not been implemented. Finally, losses, in reference to the counterfactual, turn out to be significant during the boom years in Portugal and Belgium, averaging 11.2% and 6.31%, respectively. Since the end of World War II, Europe's history has been one of continuous steps towards achieving not only economic integration -the ECSC, the EEC and the Single Market -but also further political coordination. In this context, the launching of the euro was a bold move, not ever tried before by such a large set of nations, where the two motivations intertwined (Baldwin et al, 2008) . In fact, member countries decided to join the euro even though they were well aware that the candidate countries did not constitute an optimal currency area.
That is to say, despite fulfilling the nominal criteria set out in the Treaty of Maastricht, the area still lacked the desirable wage flexibility, labour mobility as well as the implementation of a common budgetary union 13 .
However, the countries decided to embark on such an ambitious project since they estimated that the greater economic integration expected from lower transaction costs would lead member countries endogenously to achieve convergence in real terms. Moreover, the increase in trade among member countries would also prompt the implementation of the pending structural reforms to gain further competitiveness (Artis and Zhang, 1995 and Frankel and Rose, 1998).
Regarding the first channel -trade integration -results derived from the adoption of China as a major player in world trade and partly because of the increasing international fragmentation of production, the euro did not bring the expected boost to economic integration.
13.
For an overview analysis of the expected economic benefits and cost of the common currency see Mongelli and Vega (2006) . 14. Moreover, Baldwin et al (2008) qualified the origin of this increase. The channel was not one of lower Mundellian "transaction costs", but one of increasing competition derived from the extensive margin -newly-traded goods hypothesis. 15. They find that results are very sensitive to the exact econometric methodology. 16. WIOD dataset allows to disentangle foreign contribution to final production. The fact that these two channels did not come into operation helps to explain why the adoption of the euro did not give the expected boost to GDP per capita during the years prior to the Great Recession. The euro area registered only a small and temporary increase of GDP per capita, with respect to its counterfactual, which did not turn out to be significant. However, as we documented in the previous section, benefits were very heterogeneous with the peripheral countries registering the highest gains. Where did these gains come from? The euro area did bring closer financial integration. Figure 13 shows how 10-year government bond rates quickly converged towards very low levels not previously registered, especially in peripheral countries. It is in fact in part of these countries, Spain, Greece and Ireland, where the adoption of the euro brought the highest significant benefits in terms of GDP per capita. The sharp decrease in real interest rates eased their access to the credit markets, stimulating domestic demand and alleviating the lack of productivity-enhancing reforms. Therefore, the capital inflows into these countries failed to generate a lasting increase in productive capital. Figure 14 shows how gains from joining the euro area during the boom years turn out to be positively correlated with credit expansion, but at the same time, they also turn out to be positively correlated with growing imbalances, such as, rising unit labour costs or wider negative trade imbalances (Lane, 2006) . Finally countries from the central euro area -Germany, Austria and the Netherlands-, as we depicted in Figure 8 , do not seem to obtain gains or losses from the adoption of the euro: observed GDP per capita follows the same path as that predicted by the counterfactual.
In this case, even though they faced higher real interest rates and despite the competitive pressure from China, they managed to reduce unit labour costs and increase their external competitiveness through structural reforms that mainly gave more flexibility to their labour market (Scharpf, 2011 and Veld et al, 2015) . These counteracting forces balanced evenly the final outcome from the adoption of the euro.
The launching of the monetary union was an additional step, although probably the most ambitious one, in the process of European integration that started just after World War II. It is not the last stepping stone, but an additional one. In order to contextualize the benefits of the adoption of the euro within the European integration process, we have compared, for two countries -Spain and Portugal -, the benefits of joining the European Union with the benefits of joining the euro area. Results, displayed in Figure 15 , show that although the euro did not bring the expected lasting gains, the GDP per capita of both countries is currently higher than it would have been, had they not participated in the European integration process (Campos et al, 2015) . These results highlight the welfare improving effects of the integration process, but they also stress the need for further steps to "implement a consistent strategy around the virtuous triangle of growth-enhancing structural reforms, investment and fiscal responsibility" . Behind this aggregate result, we identify three different patterns across countries.
First, for the group of countries comprising Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, joining the euro did not bring any significant gain or loss relative to their counterfactual. Second, the group of countries including Spain, Ireland and Greece greatly benefit from joining the euro during the years of expansion. And finally, in the third group -Italy, Portugal and Belgiumthe relative gains from adopting the common currency were very temporary and quickly translated into losses relative to the counterfactual.
The success of the euro relied on endogenously achieving real convergence, which would act as an external constraint pushing countries to pursue structural reforms and thereby increasing potential output. The anticipated further trade integration was expected to also spur market demands for implementing the pending structural reforms. However, the emergence of China as a major player in world trade severely affected the second ingredient from coming into operation and prompted reforms in the central European countries which faced heightened external competitiveness, but not in the peripheral countries as was initially expected and desired. Also, the favourable financing conditions brought by the euro to previously inflationary member countries induced governments to delay the needed structural reforms. Therefore, the lack of a significant positive difference between the observed path of the euro area GDP per capita and its counterfactual might not be attributed to the common currency per se but to a combination of different factors, included the perversion of the incentives to implement the much needed structural reforms.
This evaluation of the euro project in terms of per capita GDP has to be understood, however, in the broader context of European integration where continuous and decisive steps forward have to be taken. The recent Five Presidents' Report highlights that in order for all members to gain from the euro, they will need to evolve from the current system of rules and guidelines involved in national economic policy-making towards a system of further sovereignty-sharing within common institutions. This will require Member States increasingly to accept joint decision-making on aspects of their respective national budgets and economic policies. Table A1 : Synthetic weights of countries in the donor pool 
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